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As World \Var II drew to a close in Europe, the victorious Allies faced the question
of v,:hat to do with the political and military leaders of defeated Germany. The war had
been like none other; they needed a drastically new approach to the final treatment of those
in charge of the Axis powers. \t\Thile war crimes could be punished under the Geneva and
Hague Conventions, no international agreements assigned personal responsibility to those
who ordered the crimes.
While Axis leaders could have been simply executed, the Allies chose to plan a cooperative international trial. The resulting International :\1ilitary Tribunal (IMT)-commonly
known as the Kuremberg trial-was a carefully planned, well-funded and adequately staffed
experiment in international law that is often cited today. Before the Nuremberg trial ended,
a similar effort began in the Far East for Japanese leaders, but it had less support and has
been the subject of far less historical analysis.
Why is the Nuremberg trial often considered a watershed event while its Tokyo counterpart is at best a legal footnote? After more than a half-century of criticism, it is obvious that
a major war crimes trial for national leaders, though preferable to summary execution, was
more suited to the situation in Germany than in Japan. The Allies developed t he London
Charter that governed the IMT to try German leaders for more than just conventional war
crimes, and the

~uremberg

trial was tied to those circumstances. vVhile many Japanese

leaders were guilty of war crimes, the situation might have been more eil'ectively dealL with
by separate courts-martial. In other words, the complexities of the Asian situation revealed
the IMT frame·work's limitations.
Both Allied goals and the geopolitical context help explain the Japanese trial's relative
lack of importance. At Nuremberg, t he Allies were still attempting to establish a framework for international judicial cooperation and to discredit Nazism in Germany. The Tokyo
trial lacked the same sense of urgency and purpose. K uremberg had already set the legal precedent, time's progression had revealed a vVestern-Soviet rift, and the uS-dominated
occupation of Japan found oLher ways to meet democratization goals.

2

Background
It is a testimony to the influence of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) that today

wartime atrocities are often, if not usua1ly, defined with terminology first used for the trial. 1
The Nuremberg trial followed the rules and procedures set out in the London Charter, which
was a product of the International Conference on Military Trials (ICMT). Article 6 of this
document defines prosecutable crimes:
The following acts, or any of them , are crimes coming within the jurisdiction
of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility:
(a) CRJMES AGAINST PEACE: namely, planning, preparation, initiation, or
waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties,
agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for
the accomplishment of any of the foregoing;
{b) WAR CRJMES: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall incfude, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation
to slave labor or for any purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing
of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities,
towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity;
(c) CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, exterminaLion, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war or persecution on political, racial or religious
grounds in execution or in connection with any crimes within the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of domestic law of the country where
perpetrated. 2
The United Nations, as the Allies then called themselves, argued in 1945 that each of
these definitions was justified by established international law: 6(a) under the controversial
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, 6(b) under the Hague and Geneva Conventions of 1907 and
1929 respectively, and 6(c) under an international form of common law.
The Crimes Against Peace charge, based as it was on the Kellogg-Briand Pact, had a
shaky legal foundation that was challenged before and during the trials. In fact, only the War
Crimes charge was firmly established in international law. Since the defendants accepted the
1 In this paper, war crime denotes violations of Lhe Hague and/ or Geneva Conventions, while atrocities
denotes violations in general.
2
Charter of the International Military Tribunal. Available 20 Scp 2000
< http:/ j www.yale.eduj lawwebjavalon/ imt/ procj imtconst.htm> .
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immorality of actions such as mass murder or slave labor, no one was likely to challenge the
Crimes Against Humanity charge even though it had the least formal basis in international
law.
One shortcoming of the Kellogg-Briand Pact is that it expressly allowed wars of selfdefense, but defined neither that term nor "war of aggression"- an omission which the
Japanese defendants at the Tokyo trial attempted to use to their advantage. Also, since
the Pact took the form of a contract, some argued that violation invited compensational,
not criminal, penalties. 3 Several authorities on international law even held that violation of
the Pact merely forfeited the rights to its benefits- for example, after Italy invaded Abyssinia
(Ethiopia) in 1935, other Pact signatories could then attack Italy in a "war of aggression."4
~egative

opinions of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the Crimes Against Peace charge,

.

originated with the belief that international law is based on formal agreements, not just
precedent. For example, Professor Andre Gras, one of the two French representatives to
the ICMT in London, stated, "Y.le think !personal responsibility for starting warsj would be
morally and politically desirable, but that it is not international law." 5 Many legal scholars
withheld support pending an international agreement that would add specific criminal penalties to the Kellogg-Briand Pact. An opposing view of international law, especially in the
United States, judged international law to be akin to Anglo-American common law; formal
international agreements were helpful, but not required for a criminal charge. Based on this
view, Article 6(a), Crimes Against Peace, was included in the London Charter.
The Allies also designed the Charter as a response to postwar public opinion; it applied
specifically to publicized Nazi outrages, such as the extermination camps in Poland, to
which Allied leaders had not directly responded during the war. A Crime Against Peace, the
invasion of Poland "in violation of international treaties," began the war. \.Var Crimes, such
3 Bradley

F. Smith, The Road to Nuremberg (New York: Basic Books, 1981) , 104.
Some authorities are listed in Smith, Road, 106, along with Colonel William Chanler's au.acks on them
as having "built up [their view of international law] largely on their own and their predecessors' writings."
5
Document XXXVII:"Minutes July 19, 1945" in Robert H. Jackson, Report of Robert H. Jackson, United
States Representative to the International Conference on Military Trials, London, 1945. (Washington, DC:
United States Government P rinting Office, 1947), 297.
4
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as the massacre of Allied prisoners of war and civilians at Malmedy, Belgium, in December
1944, were still fresh in the public's mind, and the world press was still discussing the Crimes
Against Humanity committed in the concentration and death camps.
Neither International Military Tribunal was designed to cover all wartime atrocities. Official Allied policy, established by the Moscow Declaration of November 1943, designated
major and minor classes of war criminals. The London Charter targeted the "[m]ajor criminals whose offenses have no particular geographical location." The International Military
Tribunals meant to punish the highest authorities who planned aggressive war, ordered or
encouraged conventional war crimes, and orchestrated gross violations of human rights. Junior officers and enlisted soldiers- who perpetrated the vast majority of conventional war
crimes- made up the other category. They were to be "sent back to the countries in which

.

their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished." 6 These
many s·mall trials were beyond the scope of the Nuremberg trial, or the later Tokyo triaP

Prosecuted German Atrocities
The major criminals were charged with Crimes Against Peace throughout Europe. Germany violated treaties with, or the neutrality of, a long list of countries during Lhe war:
Czechoslovakia (March 1939), Poland (September 1939), Denmark and Norway {April1940),
Belgium and the Netherlands {May 1940) , Yugoslavia and Greece (April 1941), the Soviet
Union (June 1941), the United States {December 1941), and Italy (May 1943). France and
the United Kingdom, though Allied Powers, are not included on the list as both declared
war on Germany after the invasion of Poland.
The war crimes violations were not physical murders, but orders to commit, murder.
German practice had been very different in Western and Eastern Europe. In the West, three
6 Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt, and Joseph Stalin, "The Moscow Declaration" in Michael ~arrus ,
ed., The Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, 1945-46: A Documentary History (::\ew York: Bedford Books, 1997),

21.
7 Smaller trials later held at Nuremberg under Control Council Law Number Ten are sometimes called
the Nuremberg trials, but the term International Military Tribunal refers only to the first Nu remberg trial.
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issues formed the focus: unrestricted submarine warfare, the Commando Order, 8 and slave
labor deportations. The Germans had treated Western European civilians and prisoners of
war (POWs) relatively well compared to those in the East. There, German conduct reflected
Slavs' low place in the Nazi racial hierarchy- Polish civilians and soldiers were massacred
and Soviet POWs were allowed to starve or freeze. Only 18% of Soviet POWs taken by the
Germans survived, compared with 76% of British and American POWs. 9 At Nuremberg,
Nazi leaders were prosecuted for the directives that caused these war crimes.
To the layman, the Crimes Against Humanity charge defined in Article 6(c) of thr London Charter seems to be a forerunner to the charge of genocide and to apply mainly to the
Holocaust. Since much of the Holocaust was covered under War Crimes, Crimes Against
Humanity actually had a much wider scope. The Crimes Against Humanity charge was

.

designed to cover all Nazi war crime-like behavior that fell outside formal war crimes definitions, such as Nazi anti-Jewish laws, placement of German dissidents in concentration
camps, and the deportation of Western European Jews. 10

Prosecuted Japanese Atrocities
Led by its Imperial Army, Japan had also broken treaties with a string of countries,
beginning with the 1931 takeover of Manchuria, a warlord-controlled Chinese region. In 1937,
a full-scale invasion of the rest of China, known as the China In cid ent, foll owed. Arou nd
the same time, Soviet and Japanese troops fought two border incidents in Manchuria and
Mongolia. Although they took place outside Soviet territory, in the Indictment these two
episodes were included as instances of aggressive warfare against the USSR. fin ally, in late
1941 came the attacks on British, United States, and Portuguese territories that started the
8

The Commando Order, issued from the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW, or High Command of
the Armed Forces) 18 October 1942, stated that all captured Allied commandos (usually raiding forces) or
parachutists were to be turned in as criminals to t.he Sicherheitsdienst (SD, or Security Service) and usually
executed, instead of being given prisoner-of-war status.
9 Terence Pritie, The Velvet Chancellors: A History of Post-War Germany (London: Frederick Muller
Limited, 1979), 24.
10 International Military 'Iribunal at Nuremberg, ''Indictment of the International Military Tribunal Against
Hermann Goring et al." Available 20 Sep 2000
< http:/ j www.yale.edu/ lawweb j avalon/ imtj procj counL.htm> .
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Pacific War. The outbreak of war also induced the French government of Indo-China and
Siamese (Thai) authorities to accept Japanese demands without a fight , and the Dutch to
declare war on Japan before their East Indies colony was attacked.
War crimes were a more complicated matter, since neither Japan nor the USSR were
signatories of the Geneva Convention of 1929- though in 1942 communiques J apancse leaders
agreed to observe all Geneva guidelines. The prosecution dealt with this problem by indicting
the accused for a "plan or conspiracy... to order, authorise !sic] and permit ... breaches of
the Laws and Customs of War'' or because they "deliberately and recklessly disregarded their
legal duty to take adequate steps to secure the observance and prevent breaches [of the Laws
of War]." 11
A few war crimes committed by Japanese forces, such as the Rape of Nanking and the
Bataan Death March, \vere well known. Also, only around 72% of British and United States
POWs survived Japanese custody compared with 96% in the German caseP Although
tropical diseases and life partially account for the higher death rate in Asia, Japanese camps
certainly did not follow Geneva guidelines. The Japanese used both Allied POWs and local
peoples as slave labor; ironically for a nation claiming to fight for the liberation of Asia,
Asians fared much worse than European colonials under Japanese occupation. The Tokyo
prosecution only of violations against citizens of the Western Powers and China excluded t he
majority of these crimes-which could have been covered under Crimes Against Humanity.
Unlike the German case, specific orders to Japanese units to commit atrocities do not
exist. 13 The prosecution case for Crimes Against Humanity thus was based largely on the
failure of the accused to properly restrain lower officers- or even those in other branches of
government. This dubious application of the military principle of command responsibility
to international law remains controversial, as does whether or not Japanese leaders were
11

''lndictment" in Department of State, Trial of the Japanese War Criminals (Washington: United States
Government Printing Office, 1945), 612.
12 John Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War· II {l'iew York: New Press, 1999), 446.
13
Dower, Embracing Defeat, 466. There may have been orders among the documents destroyed during the
two weeks between the Japanese surrender and the first landings of Allied occupation personnel.
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responsible.

Development of the Trial Plan
The Moscow Declaration made no mention of trials to estab1ish the gu ilt of those accused
of wartime atrocities. This omission was partly motivated by the hope that lack of detail
would enco urage German authorities to adhere to the laws of war more closely. Specifi c
punishments, on the other hand, might com municate to capital offenders- such as the high
command- that the cause was already lost, which might lead to reprisals such as razing
occupi ed territory or slaughtering all prisoners. 14
The Big Three- Prime Minister Winston Churchill of t he United Kingdom, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt of the United States, and Marshall Josef Stalin of t he Soviet Unionwho issued the Moscow Declaration, made all the major Allied executive decisions during
the war. Their decisions were the final ones, and it is clear that the Big T hree did not
assume capital offenders would be tried in a trial. Stalin first proposed the idea of a trial
to Churchill and Roosevelt, although with Soviet show trials of t he 1930s as a background
this hardly meant impartial justice. At Tehran in November 1943, Stalin suggested to
Churchill, possibly to irk him, t hat trials might result in the execution of 50,000 German
officers. Anglo-American leaders understandably preferred a different approach; Churchill
in particular was worried about ex post .facto add itions to international law. 15 Churchill's
answer to the problem was summary execution of Nazi leaders, a list of whom wo uld be
made up by t he Allies. As precedent, he cited the British exile of Napoleon to St. Helena
without a trial. 16
Besides being attractively simple, this plan had the support of key officials in the US and
British governments. Secretary of t he Treasury Henry Morgenthau's department developed
a comprehensive occupation plan for Germany, known as the Morgenthau Plan. A harsh
14

Smith, Road, 9.
ll>Smith, Road, 271 n. 45. Churchill's ex post facto worries dealt with aggressive war in particular and
were, as discussed earlier, well-founded.
16
Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1992), 30-32.
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document in many respects, on the punishment question it took a particularly hard-line
approach. On the British side, Lord Chancellor John Simon was struck by the legal difficulties
of an international trial and advocated a political, rather than judicial, solution- such as
summary executionY In September 1944, Roosevelt and Churchill met for the Octagon
Conference in Quebec, and Morgenthau and Simon brought their proposals to the discussion.
Although the Soviet Union was not represented, the plan for a political solution gained
preliminary approval as official Allied policy.
Soon after the Octagon Conference, details from the Morgenthau Plan appeared in German Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels' radio broadcasts. Roosevelt, running for reelection, faced accusations of needlessly lengthening the war with policies such as the Morgenthau Plan and the demand for unconditional surrender. Due to widespread opposition,
he publicly withdrew ·his support for the Quebec agreement. 18 Stalin hardened his stance
in favor of war crimes trials, insisting shortly afterward that "lt.Jhere must be no executions
without trial, otherwise the world would say we were afraid to try them.'' 19
Specific plans for a war crimes trial developed in t he US War Department, which was
headed by veteran politician Henry L. Stimson. In 1931, as Herbert Hoover's Secretary of
State, Stimson had supported the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and had unsuccessfully called for
a decisive response to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. After hearing details of the
Morgenthau plan just before the Octagon conference, Stimson wrote Morgenthau: "Such
methods, in my opinion, do not prevent wars; they tend to breed them." 20 He immediately
began preparing a War Department response to Jreasury's Morgenthau Plan, enlisting support from Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall and Judge Advocate General Myron B.
Cramer for a judicial solution to the problem of major war criminals. Cramer, who was
17

Smith, Road, 45.
Smith, Road, 54-55.
19
Ftom a summary telegram from Churchill to Roosevelt discussing communication with Stalin. Foreign
Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers and the Conferences at Malta and Yalta (Washington,
DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1955), 401.
20
Document 13: "From Henry L. Stimson to Henry Morgenthau, Jr., September 5, 1944" in Bradley F.
Smith, ed., The American Road to Nuremberg: the Doct£mentary Record (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution
Press, 1982), 24.
18

9

familiar with the pitfalls of international law, advocated a simple approach: include only
crimes prosecutable under existing international agreements such as the Geneva Convention,
and try them under a simplified court-martial.
A much more extensive plan came from Lieutenant Colonel Murray C. Bernays, a formerly
civilian attorney who had enlisted as a War Department legal adviser. Bernays' proposal
included the controversial prosecution of aggressive war as well as an ambitious framework
for defining "criminal organizations," such as the Gestapo or SS, so that "adjudication of
guilt would require no proof... other than membership in the conspiracy." 21 Bernays envisioned one very large initial trial followed by short hearings to cover all atrocities, not
just those committed by top leaders. The plan was heavily criticized- even inside the War
Department- as a pseudo-judicial political solution that could martyr the accused.
Bernays' idea was almost completely out of favor when an event during the Battle of the
Bulge saved it. On 17 December 1944, near Malmedy, Belgium, a unit of the First SS Panzer
Division massacred unarmed civilians and prisoners of war. This event convinced several
top US officials- including Attorney General Francis Biddle and Judge Samuel Rosenman,
one of Roosevelt's closest advisors- that a criminal Nazi conspiracy existed. 22 Energized
by the turn of events, Bernays and General John Weir drafted a memorandum for the
President eventually signed by Rosenman and three cabinet secretaries-Biddle, Stimson,
and Secretary of State Edward Stettinius.
Shortly after receiving the memorandum, Roosevelt departed for the Yalta Conference.
Since the Conference took place in February 1945 during the final phase of the attack on
Germany proper, most expected the Big Three to produce a final plan for dealing ·with the
major war criminals. However, whether because of Yalta's demanding agenda or further
disagreements on the trial issue, the Yalta Declaration stated only that "the question of the
21

Document 16: "Trial of European War Criminals (by Colonel Murray C. Bernays, G1), September 15,
1944" in Smith, American Road, 36.
22 Smith, American Road, 51. See also the several Documents cited. Ironically, it was later revealed that
the local commander was entirely responsible for the Malmedy Massacre and the action had not been part
of any conspiracy.
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major war criminals should be the subject of inquiry by the three Foreign Secretaries for
report in due course." 23 In March, Roosevelt sent Judge Rosenman to London to work out a
final plan for dealing with the major war criminals. Rosenman and Lord Chancellor Simon
initially compromised on summary execution for the highest officials such as Adolf Hitler or
Hermann Goring, but trials for all others, but on 12 April 1945 the British War Cabinet
rejected the proposal. Since Roosevelt died on the same day, Rosenman had to return to
Washington without meeting his goal.
Bernays' trial plan won its final victory when new President Harry Truman decided during
his first briefing on the subject that a trial was indispensable. By the month's end, Truman
had appointed Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson as Chief Counsel of the United
States for war crimes-before trials were even official Allied policy. Riding the resultant

.

tide of publicity, Truman sent Judge Rosenman to the San Francisco Conference, where
world representatives were founding the postwar United Nations organization. 24 Rosenman's
mission was to secure agreement to a Four-Power trial representing the Republic of France,
the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom , and the United States. The Foreign Ministers agreed
in principle, but were again too busy to spend much time on specifics in San Francisco, so
instead scheduled the International Conference on Military Trials (IC.MT) to begin in June
in London, charged with producing a charter for the court.

The International Conference on Military Trials
By the time the ICMT began, the war in Europe was over. Hitler and the highest-ranking
Nazis-excepting Hermann Goring- were confirmed dead, greatly relieving worries that a
trial would simply be a vehicle for Nazi propaganda. The other countries' ICMT representatives were no less prestigious than Supreme Court Justice Jackson. The Soviets sent General
I. T. Nikitchenko of the Soviet Supreme Court and Professor A. N. Thainin, who had written

a lauded book about Nazi leaders' culpability for the crime of aggressive war. France sent
23 ''The
24

Yalta Conference: Signed Agreements" in Malta and Yalta, 979.
Taylor, Anatomy, 45.
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Judge Robert Falco of their highest court, and Professor Andre Gros, an international law
authority. British representatives were t.he Lord Chance1lor, Lord Simon, and the Attorney
General, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe. Halfway through the Conference, Churchill's coalition
was defeated in elections and the new representatives became Lord Jowitt aud Sir Hartley Shawcross, though for continuity the new government. kept Maxwell-Fyfe as the official
British liaison.
The Cold War rift began to emerge at the conference. General William Donovan, head
of the US Office of Strategic Services (OSS, precursor to the CIA), took a special interest in
the major war criminals and heavily influenced Jackson to distrust the Soviets. 25 Jackson's
doubts about Soviet dedication to a fair trial appeared well-founded when Nikitchenko noted
that at Yalta "Nazi organizations were declared to be illegal and criminal" and to try them

.

would presume the possibility of overruling that decision. 26 Three days later, he again
surprised the conference with the statement, "V.le are dealing here Vi7ith the chief war criminals
who have already been convicted and whose conviction has already been announced by both
t.he Moscow and Crimea declarations.... Only the rules of fair trial must., of course, apply."
Jackson deftly answered that the United States would not set up "a mere formal judicial
body.... There could be but one decision in this case, ... [b]ut the reason is the evidence and
not the statements made by heads of state." 27
In addition to facing such political problems, the ICMT also initiated real multilateral
negotiation on the subject of the trial. Up to this point, discussants had rather naively
assumed that once they agreed on the principle of a trial, specifics would fall into place.
Common law, which developed in Britain and the United States, differed in both philosophy and practice from the Roman-derived continental law of France and the Soviet Union.
Continental law makes no presumption of innocence and regards the judiciary as an a rm of
state power- not as a balance to the legislative and executive branches.
25 Ann

Tusa and John Tusa, The Nuremberg Trial (New York: Atheneum, 1983), 78.
Document XIII: "Minutes June 26, 1945" in Jackson, Report, 77.
27 Document XVII: "Minutes June 29, 1945" in Jackson, Report, 104-106. This is especially interesting
since Nikitchenko was later an IMT judge at Nuremberg.
26
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These differences led to misunderstandings and delayed consensus. For example, Jackson's assertion that the court would have no part in prosecuting the criminals confused French
and Soviet representatives since in their systems the prosecutor was a member of the court.
The conference solved this problem by clearly specifying separation of powers- a principle of
common law- in the Charter. Jackson also used the term indictment interchangeably with

presentation of charges, while in continental law an indictment is a documentary collection
of charges and evidence. The compromise on this issue included charges and some, but not
all, of the evidence against the accused in the Indictment.
Another major issue to be negotiated was the criminality of aggressive war. This was
unsurprising considering the imperfections of the various Allies- the USSR had aLtacked
Poland, Finland, the Baltics, and Japan, and the Western Powers sent expeditions against

.

Norway, Iceland, Persia (Iran), and various Vichy French possessions, all in violation of
treaties. French representative Gros first called the Crimes Against Peace charge into question on 19 July 1945 on these points: "It is a creation by four people ... .It is ex post facto
legislation ... .It is declaring as settled someLhing discussed for years as if we were a codification commission." To this, Jackson characteristically replied, "But we are a codification
commission for the purposes of this trial as I see it." 28 Since the issue had been discussed
twice before in Washington, within the War Department and the Cabinet, Jackson should
have offered more convincing arguments. For example, a memorandum existed LhaL persuasively argued the criminality of aggressive war under current international law, but Jacksoll
never referred to it or its arguments. 29
Soviet representatives attempted to settle the issue by placing a key phrase in Part
(a), Article VI, the charge of aggressive war, defining aggressive war as criminal only when
committed by the Axis Powers- to which Jackson vehemently objected.
A stalemate ensued for several sessions, leading Jackson to suggest that each of the Allies
28 Document

XXXVII: "Minutes July 19, 1945" in Jackson, Report, 295-296.
Document 30: "War Department Memorandum (by Major Brown and Colonel Bernays, Gl) , January
4, 1945" in Smith, American Road, 93. It is possible Jackson himself never saw the document, but he would
have been familiar with the ideas since Bernays was on his TCMT staff.
29
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could conduct separate trials. The proposal was threatening to the USSR, which had only
one suspected major war criminal in custody, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, and so would get
little publicity. 30 Jackson flew to Potsdam to meet with President Truman, who instructed
him to back off on separate trials pending the Potsdam Declaration, which may have saved
the ICMT. It stated specifica1ly that the Allies wanted a single trial and hoped thai "the
negotiations in London will result in speedy agreement." 31 Returning on 2 August 1945,
Jackson found everyone ready to include the aggressive war charge without the controversial
phrase. After another week finalizing the phrasing of translations, Jackson and the other
representatives signed the Charter of the International Military Tribunal on 8 August 1945.
The trial would begin at the earliest feasible date- October 1945, less than two months away.

The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
When the trial opened, the Allies had occupied Germany for about five months. During
the war they had concentrated on military campaigning but done little planning for what
would happen after the end of hostilities. The majority of the Potsdam Declaration dealt with
details of the Four-Power occupation in Germany, whose mission was to make it "possible for
!the German people] in due course to take their place among the free and peaceful peoples
of the world." 32
Postwar Germany was just beginning to take shape. The Allies ruled through the Control Council, which included British, French, Soviet, and United States representatives. Each
country's occupation forces translated each Control Council decision into policy in its respective zone. The Allies kept the German bureaucracy mostly intact after purging Nazis
from the civil service and local government, though at least at the beginning occupation
guidelines were sometimes vague or unevenly applied. Against t his background. the IMT
30 Taylor,

Anatomy, 89.
For an example of Jackson's statements, see Document XVII: ''1\1inutes of Conference Session of June
29, 1945" in Jackson, Report, 115. The full text of the Potsdam Declaration is available at
< http:/ / www.yale.edujlawwebjavalon/decade/decadel7.htm> ; see Part VI. War Criminals.
32 "The Potsdam Declaration." Available 12 October 2000
< http://www.yale.edu/ lawweb/ avalon/decade/ decadel7.htm> .
31
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was virtually the only joint, well-planned project that took place. Despite disagreements,
the Allies were pursuing a definite goal to provide "indisputable proof of the [criminality of
the) Nazi regime" such as a trial would give. 33
The victorious powers had learned from the mistakes made at the Versailles Peace Conference after World War I, which the Nazis had used to rise to power in Germany. Though there
are a few striking similarities between the Treaty of Versailles and the Potsdam Declarationsuch as Germany bearing sole guilt for the war and having to pay reparations-in 1945, the
Allies were in full control and determined to reform the German people. With this in mind,
the Indictment submitted to the Nuremberg IMT targeted not just Nazis and their party
apparatus but also bankers and industrialists and longer-lived organizations such as "the General Staff of the High Command of the German Armed Forces." 34 The Allies also wanted

.

to prove to the world-including their own citizens-that they had acted rightly and that
World War II had been a just war. This purpose was closely tied to the Allies' idealistic
hopes of setting up a stable and rational postwar order, exemplified in the founding of the
United Nations.

The Court and Defendants
Time constraints forced the prosecution to rush preparation of the Nuremberg Indictment,
which it finally submitted on 6 October 1945, just twelve days before the trial began. After
signing the London Charter, Jackson had only about two months to decide on defendants,
collect evidence, and bring formal charges. A preliminary list of names had included twentyfour defendants and six accused organizations, who were selected to represent all the major
branches of Nazism and anti-democratic Germany. Though the prosecution would have done
well to revise this list, time did not allow. 35
33

Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, quoted in Bradley F. Smith, Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg (New York:
Basic Books, 1977), 42.
34
''1ndictment Against Hermann Goring et al." International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War
Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946, 42 vols.
(Nuremberg: International Military 'fribunal, 1947). Available 12 October 2000
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The most famous defendant was Hermann Goring, who had long been the number two
man in the Nazi party and headed the Luftwaffe (Air Force). He was, as Justice Jackson
later stated in court, "the only living man who can expound ... the true purposes of the Nazi
Party and the inner workings of its leadership." 36 The highest-ranking SS survivor, Ernst
Kaltenbrunner, was indicted, as were other organizational heads such as Joachim Ribbentrop (Foreign Minister) , Albert Speer (Minister for Armaments after 1942) , and Robert Ley
(Labor Front). Defendants outside the Nazi hierarchy included career military officers, industrialists, and conservative politicians such as Grand Admiral Karl Donitz, head of the
German Navy and Hitler's successor as Fuhrer; Field Marshall Wilhelm Keitel , head of the
High Command of the Armed Forces; Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach of the Krupp
conglomerate; and Franz von Papen, Chancellor in 1932 and influential in Hitler's 1933

.

appointment as Chancellor.
The London Charter required that the International Military Tribunal meet in Berlin
to receive the Indictment, though for practical reasons the ICMT had selected Nuremberg
as the site of the triaL At this meeting, Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United
States were each represented by two judges, one voting and a non-voting alternate. The
judges announced the election of Lord Geoffrey Lawrence of Great Britain as President of
the Tribunal and that the first court session would be in Nuremberg on 20 November 1945.
Before the first session , Robert Ley hanged himself in his Nuremberg cell, escaping trial.
Then, on 7 November the Tribunal's medical team pronounced Gustav Krupp unable to
travel from his Austrian villa. This announcement led to a brief prosecution attempt to
either try Gustav in absentia or amend the Indictment to add his son Alfried, against whom
there was a stronger case. The latter strategy prompted main French judge Donncdieu
de Vabres to demand, "Do you consider th at you can propose to the Court to substitute
one name for another?" 37 Though the rejection of both alternatives hurt the prosecution 's
36 "Cross
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prestige, it perhaps strengthened the Tribunal's reputation for justice.

Proceedings
The prosecution, which dominated most of the proceedings, had separated the presentation of its case into four phases, which would be covered by teams from the United States,
Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union respecUvely. The first phase dealt. with Count
One, "the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy," a charge only implied
in the London Charter. On 21 November, Justice Jackson gave his opening address , "an
optimistic, Wilsonian credo that looked to the future as much as to the past and that saw
the trial as a blow against aggressive wars." 38 The conspiracy charge was based on a good
deal of evidence ranging from Mein Kampf to secret Nazi party meetings that , the prosecution argued, showed that Hitler and other top Nazis planned aggressive warfare and other
atrocities all along. vVhile the prosecution had a good case against several defendants, the
conspiracy presentation tended to oversimplify the workings of Nazi Germany as a monolithic state bent to one end. In reality, and as the defendants later argued, there were no
well-planned and detailed goals- only general ones.
The United States' phase concentrated on documentary evidence (as opposed to witnesses), which resulted in copying and translation problems as well as boredom for the
whole courtroom. However, some of the documents did cause a stir, such as a report on
the destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto, which glorified the "energetic action" of the SS even
though it was so one-sided that there were only 16 casualties verses 56,065 "proved" killed. 39
An innovation in presentation was professionally prepared film evidence from Nazi and Allied
archives, which was presented though screenings with titles such as The Nazi Plan and Nazi
Concentr-ation Camps. 40 The United States team received a great deal of publicity for this,

though the evidence presented in later phases would have been no less shocking had it come
first.
38Marrus,
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The British phase was very short since it concentrated on Count Two (Crimes Against
Peace), and consequently was little more than a list. of treaties and when the Nazis had
violated them. This does not mean that the British did not fully support the trial. Though
there were only about one-tenth as many British as Americans, British barristers had already
assisted during part of the United States phase. The British presented this part of the case
well, and the American press amusingly "soon formed the opinion that the British prosecution
team was plainly superior." 41
After the British phase, the United States and British prosecutors made a joint summation of evidence against each defendant. Following this, the court asked the prosecution to
better define the criminal organizations, particularly the requirements for membership. For
example, General Staff was a generic term, and while an officer might be identified as a staff

.

officer, this was hardly membership in an organization. Also, the SS had actually drafted
members late in the war; would draftees be guilty along with volunteers? General Roman
Rudenko, Soviet. head prosecutor, stated that "naturally, we cannot exclude the possibility
that there might be individual members who might. have been lured into the organization." 42
Unfortunately, millions of members pleading ignorance of an organization's criminality would
remove the charge's main benefit.
Next began the French prosecution phase. The French and Soviets each covered both
Counts Three (War Crimes) and Four (Crimes Against Humanity), with the French focusing on Western and the Soviets on Eastern Europe. Like the British, the French had a
small prosecution team- understandably since most of the new French government's energies went into rebuilding France's institutions. They made forceful presentation of life under
Nazi occupation, however, including Germanization, Gestapo torture, broad reprisals, and
deportations. Even many defendants were disgusted at Goring's participation in the theft
of art treasures to sell for personal profit. 43
41
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The Soviet phase had a completely different character. The Nuremberg IMT took place
shortly after the war's end, and the West was still discovering the the wartime brutality
in Eastern Europe. French complaints about the destruction of vVorld War I monuments
seemed absurd compared to the tales of the millions slaughtered in Poland. Not to be
outdone, the Soviets also presented a film , Atrocities by the German Fascist Invaders in
the USSR that was much more graphic than the earlier ones. Other testimony covered

the Einsatzgruppen, specialized SS units that shot Jews and Communist officials behind
battle lines in the USSR, and ''previously little-known information" about death camps like
Auschwitz, where systematic killing was an added concentration camp terror. 44 After Soviet
testimony, any defendant closely connected to these atrocities-such as Hans Frank, governor
of Poland- was almost assured a death penalty.

.

The defense cases, though most were individually strong, helped the prosecution overall
since many defendants tried to save themselves by implicating others. Of course, defense
counsel were at a significant disadvantage compared to the prosecution. Most obviously, the
London Charter, which governed the Tribunal and established its jurisdiction, had been written specifically to convict a list of war criminals that was "conveniently settled in advance.u 45
While the authors may not have had each individual defendant in mind , the Charter's definition of international law at least put them in a bad light. Additionally, public opinion so
opposed the Nazis that the defense certainly knew that many people were convinced only
''with some difficulty, that summary execution was not a desirable solution." 46 The defense
was also hurt by lack of time and resources--documents the prosecution had used were
available, but the Allied archives were not.
After the Soviet phase concluded, the defense began its presentation with the case of
Hermann Goring, who took the witness stand. Although in the Nazi regime's later years
he had become a slovenly drug addict, during his time in prison he had returned to his
44 Marrus,
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former fit and shrewd self. His testimony, though it failed to help his case since he freely
admitted many crimes, was impressive in its scope and detail. Goring attempted to discredit
the Tribunal by implying that its basis in international law was outdated or simply wrong:
"[Following] these Hague Convention regulations for land warfare, ... a modern war could not
be fought under any circumstances." 47 During Jackson's cross-examination, Goring seemed
to outsmart the Supreme Court Justice through superior knowledge of the facts. Telford
Taylor, one of the United States team, observed, "It was a blow from which Jackson only
gradually recovered." 48
Most other defendants had far less spectacular cases. Ernst Kaltenbrunner had headed
the Reich :y:Jain Security Office of the SS, which controlled both the Gestapo and the Ein-

satzgruppen. He unconvincingly argued that he really had authority only over matters of

.

security and intelligence, while SS leader Heinrich Rimmler had exercised direct control over
most matters- naturally including the criminal ones. Another example was Albert Speer, a
young architect who became Armaments Minister during the war, who revealed to the court
that he had considered killing Hitler. Unlike Kaltenbrunner, however, Speer stated "!we]
leaders must accept a common responsibility.... But to what extent that is punishable under
law or ethics I cannot decide." 49 Speer, though one of the few to accept any responsibility
for wartime actions, still limited his personal culpability.
The case of Karl Donitz, head of the German

~avy

after 1943, set a precedent in inter-

national law concerning submarine warfare. To defend him against the charge that orders
to sink merchant vessels were illegal, Donitz's lawyer Otto Kranzbuhler secured an affidavit
from Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, commander of the United States Pacific Fleet. Nimitz
answered questions describing the practice of the United States Navy concerning submarines
and merchant ships, especially when a submarine crew had no way of knowing whether or not
an enemy merchant ship was armed. German practice was indistinguishable from American,
47
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making it "as clear as clear could be that if Doenitz and [German Admiral Erich] Raeder
deserved to hang for sinking ships without warning, so did Nimitz." 50 The court acquitted
Donitz and Raeder on the charge.

Judgment
After the last defense case rested, closing statement::; by the defense and prosecution
followed and, on 31 August 1946, the Tribunal adjourned to prepare its judgment. Exten::;ive
notes taken by Francis Biddle, main judge for the United States, reveal the process by which
the Tribunal reached its decisions during the recess. 51 British and American staff did most
of the work since they had the best knowledge of Anglo-American law, on which the London
Charter was based. The judges themselves met for several sessions to discuss the individual
guilt of each defendant for the Indictment's four counts: Conspiracy, Crimes Against Peace,
War Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity.
In reaching its decision, the Tribunal never strayed from the London Charter in interpreting international law. Challenges to the inclusion of Crimes Against Peace, based on
the Kellogg-Briand Pact, were ignored since the Charter was the law by which the Tribunal
judged. The Indictment's first charge, Conspiracy, was especially problematic since it was
neither defined in the Charter nor a crime under Lhe law practiced in France or Germany.
French judge De Vabres argued that the charge could not then be part of international law
and so should be thrown out, but the oLhers overruled him. Only eight defendants, out of
twenty-two, were convicted on Count One, and none were convicted solely on it.
The Tribunal read the judgment between 30 September and 1 October 1946. Twelve
defendants- Martin Bormann, Hermann Goring, Alfred Jodl , Wilhelm Keitel , Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Hans Frank, \.Yilhelm Frick, Joachim Ribbentrop, Alfred Rosenberg, F'l:itz Saukel,
Arthur Seyss-Inquart, and Julius Streicher

were sentenced to hang. Each was found guilty
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Semitic publisher Julius Streicher. Three defendants- Franz von Papen, Hjalmar Schacht,
and Hans Fritsche- were acquitted of being major war criminals, but after being released
were arrested by German police and convicted of lesser crimes. 52 Three others received life
sentences, with the remaining four getting sentences ranging from ten (Admiral Donitz) to
twenty (Albert Speer) years. They served their time as the only inmates of Spandau Prison
in the British section of Berlin. On 16 October 1946, after a petition to the Control Council
was denied, those so sentenced were hanged in the Nuremberg prison gymnasium, ending
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.

The International Military Tribunal for the Far East
Unlike Germany, Japan was not invaded and did not surrender unconditionally, but rather

.

accepted the terms of the Potsdam Protocol. Its provisions were not generous, but reassured
Japanese leaders by stating that a new government would be established ''in accordance
with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people," an ambiguous statement that allowed
for the Emperor's retention53 While the Potsdam Protocol also specified that war criminals
would be punished, it did not state under what laws or mandate a trial of suspected major
criminals.
Though the London Charter was signed before Japan surrendered, the Japanese government had little time to give its implications much thought, and had good reason to assume
that the Allies played by different rules in Europe and Asia. Just before midnight on 8
August 1945, the same day the Allies signed the London Charter, Soviet troops invaded
Japanese-contro11ed Manchuria, a violation of a neutrality pact that would not expire until
25 April1946. The next day t he United States used the second atomic bomb, on Nagasaki,
killing over 70,000 civilian Japanese, as well as 2,500 Korean laborers and 350 prisoners of
war. Since both of these actions- had they been committed by the Axis- would have been
indictable under the London Charter, it is unlikely Japan 's top leaders would have thought
2
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they would be indicted for similar actions when they surrendered on 15 August.
Such contradictions did not just come at the end; the war in East Asia had been full of
them. Perhaps most obviously, it was a war of colonial empires. Except for self-ruled parts
of China and Thailand, the territories Japan attacked- including Hawaii- were populated
mainly by Asians but ruled by Western overlords. Though early defeats of the imperial
powers stimulated local independence movements, the victors restored the prewar status quo
after defeating Japan. The American occupation censorship bureau even renamed the warfrom the Great East Asia War ( Taiheiyo-Senso) to the Pacific War-to emphasize the role
of the United States in a predominately Asian conftict. 54
The Japanese had been at war since 1937 and invariably committed the worst atrocities,
but both sides participated on a much larger scale than in Western Europe. Allied soldiers

.

regularly shot defenseless Japanese pilots or seamen, ignored the few attempts to surrender,
and collected grisly souvenirs. These practices were well-knuwn, but it would have been
"inconceivable, however, that teeth, ears, and skulls could have been collected from German
or Italian war dead and publicized in the Anglo-American countries without provoking an
uproar." 55
Unlike Germany, Japan still had a representative government at the war's end, though
one with many voices silenced though heavy censorship. Military control of Japan stemmed
from the requirement in Japan 's Meiji Constitution that both the Army and Navy Cabinet
Ministers be active officers, which meant that the military could remove a Prime Minister
at will by withdrawing its ministers. Prior to the 1930s, the military had responsible leaders
and Japan appeared to be a conservative but stable constitutional monarchy. A period in
the 1920s known as the Taisho Democracy was especially noted for its strong multiparty
government.
However, the military's aggressive attitude grew after World War I, and in the late 1920s
54 Dower,
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the military heavily influenced politics through assassination and intrigue. The pretense of
civilian government finally ended in 1931, when the Kwantung Army took control of foreign
affairs by invading Manchuria against government orders. Contrary to the stereotype of
a monolithic Japan in Allied propaganda, by 1945 many Japanese welcomed defeat since
it removed the militarists from power. These Japanese expected occupation authorities
to mandate removal of the military's autonomy, gather reparations, and then leave- some
business leaders were even overjoyed at being governed by American capitalists. 56
The former Empire of Japan was split less cooperatively than Germany. Of the major
Allies, United States troops had dominated the fighting, and likewise the occupation. US
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur became Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
(SCAP), and his word was final in Japan. The US occupied Okinawa, southern Korea,
and most of the home islands with British Commonwealth soldiers in a few places such
as Hiroshima. The Chinese Nationalist government got back Taiwan, which Japan had
controlled since 1895, and Japanese-occupied parts of China. The Soviet Union received
control of Manchuria, northern Korea, and the arctic island of Sakhalin, but had no part in
occupying the Japanese homeland.
Throughout the war, Allied leaders had promised war crimes trials for violations of the
Geneva Convention as the Allied public reacted to stories of cruelty to prisoners of war.
The highest officers connected with some of the most notorious events of the war were tried
very quickly. Japanese Generals Masaharu Homma and Tomoyuki Yamashita, commanders
respectively at the Bataan Death March and the Sack of Manila, were tried and sentenced
to death in late 1945, despite the fact that there was no compelling evidence that either was
even notified by the junior officers who ordered the crimes. 57 These early trials under the
Geneva Conventions also opened the possibility of a trial, under an arrangement similar to
56 Dower,
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Nuremberg, of Japanese leaders responsible for the war itself.
When the occupation began, a popular topic of debate was the controversial possibility
that the Emperor might be held as a war crimes suspect. MacArthur planned to rehabilitate the Emperor, Japan's most important symbol, whom he saw as the key to successful
democratization. He also purposefully declined to have experts on Japan in his occupation
staff, preferring to have a thorough, American-style, common-sense democratization carried out by occupation forces. 58 Since the United States maintained complete control with
MacArthur as Supreme Commander, in most areas he could implement his wishes without
negotiation. MacArthur made his support for the Emperor clear on 27 September, when he
invited Hirohito to his residence, one of his first actions "to create the most usable emperor
possible." 59
At the same tfme, plans to create a Far East counterpart to the IMT began. The
Nuremberg trial was just beginning, and Japan, like Nazi Germany, had leaders to try for
major crimes such as ordering the attack on Pearl Harbor or the mistreatment of prisoners
of war. A Joint Chiefs of Staff directive formed the International Prosecution Section (IPS)
to investigate war crimes, and President Truman named as its head Joseph Keenan , author
of the Lindbergh kidnapping law and an influential New Dealer under President Franklin
Roosevelt. 6

° Keenan's former position, Assistant to the Attorney General, was noticeably

inferior to that of the European prosecutor, Supreme Court Justice Jackson, leading to
speculation that Truman simply wanted Keenan out of Washington. 61 Despite its name, at
first the IPS staff was entirely American.

The Court and Defendants
International Military Tribunal for the Far East was unilaterally instigated with a SCAP
58 Dower,
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Special Proclamation on 19 January 1946. Drafted by the IPS, the proclamation was nearly
identical to the London Charter, with a few important exceptions. There could be as many

as eleven judges, with no alternates, to be "appointed by the Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers from the names submitted by the signatories to the Instrument of Surrender,
India, and the Commonwealth of the Philippines." Also, in keeping with the US dominance
of the occupation, MacArthur named a single head prosecutor- Keenan- who had subordinates appointed by any nation involved in the war against Japan. Additionally, though the
prosecutable crimes-Crimes Against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanitywere the same, the jurisdiction of the IMTFE included only defendants "charged with offenses
which include Crimes Against Peace." 62
MacArthur, who theoretically controlled the whole process, took little interest in the
IMTFE. He appointed the judges suggested by the Allies without reviewing their merits,
with disheartening results. Only one, Radhabinod Pal of India, had any prior experience
in international law, though few Nuremberg judges had such experience either. Five other
judges had various shortcomings. Mei Ju-Ao of China had no judicial experience, and, as
Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chinese legislature, was a politician by occupation. General I. M. Zaryanov of the USSR, besides being a major figure in Stalin's
show-trial purges, spoke no English or Japanese, the 'fribunal's official languages. Delfin
Jaranilla, though a member of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, was a survivor of
the Bataan Death March, which would disqualify him from trying a similar case in most
Anglo-American courts. Likewise, during the war William Webb of Australia had coordinated investigations of war crimes committed by lower-ranking Japanese. John Higgins, the
United States' first appointee, returned to his seat on the Superior Court of Massachusetts
before the trial began, possibly because Keenan expressed disappointment that the US had
not appointed a Supreme Court Justice. 63 Myron Cramer, Judge Advocate General of the
62"Charter
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Army, who had previously been influent ial in War Department planning for war crimes trials,
replaced him. On the other hand, Canada (E. Stuart McDougall) , the United Kingdom (Lord
William Patrick) , the Netherlands (B. V. A. Roling), New Zealand (Harvey Northcraft), and
France (Henri Bernard) sent well-selected representatives.
The IPS became truly international with the addition of Allied assistant prosecutors,
whom Keenan consulted when preparing the list of defendants and the Indictment. When
Soviet representative S. A. Golunsky arrived, he asserted that the USSR had the right to
choose independently two defendants. Keenan reluctantly agreed, expecting the Soviets to
name bosses of Japan's zaibatsu- huge family-controlled industrial conglomerates- which
the Soviet press had criticized as the root of Japanese capitalist aggression. Surprisingly,
Golunsky named the two signatories to the Instrument of Surrender: General Yoshijiro
Umezu, former

com~ander

of the Kwantung Army along the Soviet border, and Mamoru

Shigemitsu, former Ambassador to Moscow- neither of whom had been detained as a major
offender. 64 Each nation represented on the prosecution staff had inpu t, and so where at
Nuremberg four nations split four counts evenly, at Tokyo the resulting Indictment included
fifty-five separate counts. By the time the Tokyo Indictment was published on 29 April1946,
it was shorter than the Nuremberg Indictment but far less organized.
The defendants named in the Tokyo Indictment were meant to represent aspects of
Japanese aggression. Over half of the twenty-eight were mili tary men, incl uding fourteen
generals- Sadao Araki, Kenji Doihara, Shunroku Hata, Seishiro Itagaki, Heitaro Kimura,
Kuniaki Koiso, lwane Matsui, Jiro Minami, Akira Muto, Hiroshi Oshima, Kenryo Sato, Teiichi Suzuki, Hideki Tojo, and Yoshijiro Umezu-and three admirals- Osumi Nagano, Takasumi Oka, and Shigetaro Shimada. Additionally indicted were a military propagandistColonel Kingoro Hashimoto-and two civilian ones-diplomat Toshio Shiratori and Shumei
Okawa, who while he "did not at any time hold an important responsible government position .. . was the intellectual leader behind Japan's entire aggressive program."65 Top civilian
64 Brackman,
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representatives included two Prime Ministers- Kiichiro Hiranuma and Koki Hirota (Koiso
and Tojo were also Prime Ministers, but are counted among the generals here)- and three
Foreign Ministers- Yosuke Matsuoka, Mamoru Shigemitsu, and Shigenori Togo. Other former cabinet members were Naoki Hoshino (Cabinet Secretary) and Okinori Kaya (Minister
of Finance). Lastly, in a class by himself, was Marquis Koichi Kido, Lord Keeper of the
Privy Seal, who in many eyes was indicted as the Emperor's proxy. No zaibatsu leaders were
indicted.
A preliminary hearing of the IMTFE on 3 May 1946, revealed a distinct disadvantage
for the defense. Australian \.Yilliam Webb, who had been elected President of the Tribunal,
declared that no counsel would be heard in court without being specifically selected by a
defendant as his representative. This dispute led to the resignation of the Chief of Defense
Counsel, US Navy Captain Beverly Coleman, who felt that the bench was biased toward
the prosecution. The entire Navy contingent of the defense team also resigned in protest. 66
Though each defendant still had representation, this seriously harmed the defense as a whole,
especially since Japanese lawyers usually play lit tle role in court and so were relying heavily
on US lawyers. 67 The prosecution, coordinated by Keenan, presented a single flowing case,
while the defense fragmented into separate and often antagonistic cases. Additionally, defense
resources, according to prosecution member Solis Horowitz, "were not as extensive ... [but]
upon completion of the prosecution case, prosecution language, document , and reproduction
facilities were made available for the defense." 68 This meant that during the prosecution case,
defense counsel had virtually no method of preparing evidence for their cases or checking
t he translation of prosecution documents, aside from personal time out of court.
These language and documentary problems were a far larger issue in the IMTPE t han
the IMT. Though Japanese borrows much of its vocabulary from Chinese, grammatically
"Japanese is basically as different from Chinese as it is from English." 69 The language's
66 Brackrnan,
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structure makes it notoriously difficult to translate simultaneously, which made a system
like that used at Nuremberg impossible. Court time dragged on during witness examination
while questions and answers were translated sentence by sentence. Translation of documents
was no easier, and both prosecution and defense suffered from shortages of time, translators,
and even paper.

Proceedings
The prosecution developed its case chronologically, beginning with a discussion of the
Japanese takeover of Manchuria in 1931 and proceeding to the war with China after 1937 and
the attacks of December 1941 which led to the Pacific War. These were Crimes Against Peace
in the meaning of the Charter, but Keenan seemed to have little appreciation against whom
they were committed .•In his opening statement, he claimed the defendants were "determined
to destroy ... the system of government of and by and for the people"- a description that fit
neither warlord-controlled Manchuria nor the Western colonial empires. 70
Many defendants were heavily implicated in war crimes and other atrocities such as
the Mukden Incident in Manchuria (Araki and Doihara) , the Rape of Nanking (Matsui and
Hashimoto), and the encouragement of opium trafficking to fund the government of Japanesecontrolled Manchuria (Hoshino and Kaya). As for the mistreatment of prisoners of war, the
prosecution succeeded in showing that the practice was widespread, but never produced evidence that it had been explicitly ordered at the highest level. The Japanese had been far less
meticulous about record-keeping than the Germans, so the prosecution relied more heavily
on affidavits and witness testimony. More valuable than these sources, however, was t he
diary of Marquis Kido, which he had voluntarily turned over to the prosecution. According
to Horowitz, it was their "working bible... and the main key to all further investigation." 71
The prosecution case took about seven months, from 3 June 1946 to 27 January 1947. 72
70 Joseph
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The defense case began shortly afterward, and at the beginning attempted to present a
unified case despite the Chief of Defense Counsel's resignation. However, each defendant's
case was often antagonistic toward others, anddefense counsel faced continuous problems
procuring documents and finding witnesses. Finally, after five months, the defense requested
a recess to avoid a collapse. The Tribunal reluctantly agreed to a six-week break whi ch began
23 June 1947. 73 After the court reconvened, the defense cases lasted another six months,
untill2 January 1948. 74
Kenzo Takayanagi , perhaps the foremost expert on Anglo-American law in Japan, opened
the defense in February 1947 with arguments against several charges in the Indictment. He
suggested that the Anglo-American concept of conspiracy had no basis in international law.
Takayanagi also attacked the Tribunal for misusing Japanese agreement to war crimes trials
in the surrender, arguing that the Japanese government had understood this to mean only
conventional war crimes as defined by the Geneva and Hague Conventions, such as looting
or mistreatment of prisoners. The inclusion of the Crimes Against Peace charge, especially,
violated the Potsdam Protocol.
Few generals had much to say in their own defense. General Tojo, who had been Prime
Minister at the time of Pearl Harbor, was the most famous defendant and his arguments
were typical. Tojo argued that Japan was fighting a war of self-defense, not from military
attack obviously, but from economic encirclement. In the early 1930s, civil war in Chi na
and the Great Depression seriously threatened J apan's economy. In China, t he Nationalists
boycotted Japanese goo ds while the Communists attacked Japanese businesses. Western nat ions, especially the United States, became increasingly protectionist and hostile to Japanese
imports, tying them to raw materials exports. Japan's only options, the militarists argued,
were to contract to a smaller and more vulnerable nation, or to expand and capture raw
materials at the source in places like Manchuria. The United States actually forced Japan
to war in mid-1941 by cutting off vital war supplies while Japan was involved in a war in
73 Brackman,
74

Other Nuremberg, 310-311.
Brackman, Other Nuremberg, 356.

30
China.
Some civilian defendants , primarily Foreign Ministers Togo and Shigemitsu, had st-ronger
cases due to prewar opposition to the militarists. Baron Hankey, a member of Churchill's War
Cabinet and personal friend of the defendant Shigemitsu, worked in London upon hearing
of the Indictment to gather evidence of Shigemitsu's efforts for peace and his powerlessness
against the military. In a manuscript published after the trial, he took up Togo's cause as
well. The Indictment charged that Shigemitsu and Togo had "w·aged a war of aggression"
against various countries and failed "to secure the observance and prevent breaches" of the
laws of war. 75 As for their involvement in Crimes Against Peace, "Study of the documents,
however, reveals ... both were lifelong workers for peace. Both were opposed to an Alliance
with the European Axis. Both openly opposed the military party .... Togo, at the risk of his
life, brought the war to an end; and Shigemitsu, at the risk of his life, signed the surrender." 76
In dealing with war crimes, Hankey found that both had done what could be expected of a
Foreign Minister; they passed on complaints from the Allies and the Swiss (representing the
International Red Cross) to the responsible authoriLy (the Japanese military), and returned
replies, though the military took no action. 77

Judgment
After the defense rested, the Tribunal heard prosecution and defense rebuttal until 6 April
1948.78 The IMTFE then adjourned to formulate its opinion. No counterpart to Biddle's
extensive notes exist for the Tokyo bench, so very little is known about how the Tokyo
judgment developed. It is known that the IMTFE did not meet together, but rather "seven
organized the drafting, and presented the results to the other four as a fait accompli." 79
The recess lasted almost seven months. 80 The IMTFE dismissed all challenges to its
75 ''Indictment"
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jurisdiction. On 12 November 1948, the reading of the verdicts and majority opinion was
accompanied by the announcement of five additional opinions; three were full dissents and
two were critical of some aspects. 81 No defendants were acquitted and all but two (Matsui
and Shigemitsu) were found guilty of the controversial conspiracy charge. 'I\vo defendants,
Matsuoka and Nagano, had died of natural causes during the trial, and Okawa was under
psychiatric and medical care for symptoms of advanced syphilis. Seven were sentenced to
hang: Doihara, Hirota, Itagaki, Kimura, Matsui, Muto, and Tojo. Shigemitsu got seven
years, Togo twenty, and the rest life sentences.
After sentencing, defendants could appeal to MacArthur. Several defense attorneys prepared an extensive criticism of the judgment as unfair and not in keeping with the spirit
of the trial. Some individual defendants asked to have their life sentences 'reduced' to
hanging-highlighting a difference in Japanese and Western value systems. On 25 Novemher MacArthur rejected all petitions. After an attempt to appeal to the US Supreme Court,
which on 20 December decided the appeal was out of its jurisdiction, the seven defendants
so sentenced were hanged at Sugamo Prison, with only military personnel and press present
to verify, as MacArthur ordered. 82

Assessment
Though the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo ended at different
times and in different settings, the immediate aftermaths were very similar. The sentencing
and executions captured headlines, but the public soon lost interest since the Cold War
quickly overshadowed the past with the possibility of another catastrophic war. Since war
crimes trials were about satisfying legal principles as well as public opinion, smaller national
trials for non-major war criminals followed the IMTs.
During the Cold War's first decade, the ideals which provided the basis of the Nuremberg
81
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and Tokyo IMTs fell by the wayside along with the organization also found ed on those ideals,
the Unit,ed Nations. In the 1960s, the UN experienced a renaissance wit h colonialism's end in
most of Africa and Southeast Asia, and Adolf Eichmann's trial in Jerusalem renewed interest
in the Holocaust and also Nuremberg. The Tokyo trial has enjoyed no such positive second
look, though some scholars now see the transcripts as "an embarrassing judicial disaster but
a goldmine of information." 83
After the USSR's collapse in 1991, the UN became a more viable player in international
politics and in some ways took up t he cause abandoned after Nuremberg. The recurrence
of Crimes Against Humanity in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia led to the establishment
of two International Criminal Tribunals on the Nuremberg model. 84 Though they lack the
benefits Allied hegemony gave the IMTs and have had less than spectacular success, the UN
ICTs confirm the longterm I\uremberg legacy.

Comparing the International Military Tribunals
The examination of the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo reveals
no obvious reason to compare them. The Nuremberg trial was far better covered in the press
and had more famous defendants. Since then, scores of articles, books, and films have noted
the wide importance of Nuremberg in realms such as politics, law, and morality. Predictably,
Nuremberg is consistently the precedent cited, while few people remember that a trial of
Japanese leaders even took place.
The apparent strength of the Nuremberg IMT was colored by preconceptions about the
Nazi defendants.

Japanese defendants, "despite the grievous crimes of which they were

accused . . . failed to exude the aura of evil personified that choked the courtroom where
their 1'\azi counterparts were tried." 85 Justice for Hitler's accomplices appeared to be an
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extraordinary accomplishment-until the same trappings were fitted to a trial of imperialist
leaders being charged, tried, and punished by their equally imperialist competitors. In other
words, the ideas behind the Nuremberg trial need to be confirmed by the Tokyo proceedings.
This imbalance is precisely why the IMTs should be compared and contrasted. They featured the same major powers- France, the UK, USA, and USSR- during the same postwar
period. Comparing Nuremberg with Tokyo is in that way more significant than , for example, comparing Nuremberg and the International Criminal Tribunals set up by the United
Nations to judge the leaders of Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia for atrocities similar to
those committed during World War II. Even if the trials' most important aspects are the
similarities in their historical settings, certainly comparison should narrow down and perhaps
reveal the reasons for their decidedly uneven legacies.
The Allies encoura-ged such comparison and fully expected to be examined and hopefully
justified by history. In his opening statement at Nuremberg, Justice Jackson stated, "vVe
must never forget that the record on which we judge these defendants is the record on which
history will judge us tomorrow."86 The Allies claimed to apply universal legal principles, ones
that should hold true for all people in all places at all times. Reconciling the courtrooms at
Nuremberg and Tokyo helps reveal the difference between principle and practice

to borrow

a phrase from a recent study, reveal 'l;he politics of war crimes trials." 87

Similarities
It is no coincidence that the same leaders ensured that both the Nuremberg and Tokyo

trials took place. This is a key similarity between the IMTs since other trials have failed
without such executive support-for example, the post-World War I plan to try Kaiser
Wilhelm II. 88 The trial plan succeeded because President Truman gave the pro-trial group
in vVashington a strong mandate to proceed.89 The origins of the Tokyo trial were less direct
86 IMT,
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but also came from Washington. 90 The heads of state during the IMTs- Atlee, Stalin. and
Truman- did not direct the trials, but both were dependent on executive authority for their
creation.
Since the London Charter governed .:-.ruremberg and was copied for Tokyo, it reveals a
great deal about the trials' successes and shortcomings. First, it provided all major judicial aspects of the IMTs, including jurisdiction, rules and procedures. Second, the London
Charter also extended the range of charges beyond traditional war crimes: Crimes Against
Peace, Crimes Against Humanity, and the Anglo-American concept of conspiracy. Third,
it secured the bench (and prosecution) for the victors only, an aspect of both trials which
has been repeatedly criticized. While public opinion would not have stood for inclusion of
even anti-Nazi German or anti-military Japanese justices, there was good reason for the
prosecution to include representatives of the Polish government in exile, the Czech or Korean resistance, or perhaps even neutral nations. Lastly, though an original purpose of the
non-traditional charges was to prosecute crimes of Germans against Germans (particularly
Jews), neither tribunal prosecuted crimes of leaders against their own people. One Japanese
researcher regards this as "one of [the IMTFE'sl greatest failings" that meant "the Japanese
people were never informed" of many crimes the militarists committed against Japanese as
well as their colonial subjects in Korea and Taiwan. 91 Of course, it is important to remember
the "conception [of the trials] during the war in an atmosphere of mutual hate." 92
The greatest impact of the London Charter's governance of jurisdiction, rules, and procedures at both IMTs was the prosecutional bias built into the system. Theoretically, this was
of little consequence since the prosecution teams should not have abused their many privileges, but in practice abuses occurred at both trials. The most obvious was of documentary
resources, which resulted in some absurd situations. For example, at the beginning of the
Nuremberg case, 250 copies of documents were given to the press but only 5 to all defense
90
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counsel, to whom the archives were closed. 93 Witness testimony provides another example:
at Tokyo, due to the impossibility of simultaneous translation, affidavits-prepared with
prosecution help- were accepted in place of courtroom witness testimony. The defense was
not permitted to have similar affidavit sessions with such witnesses, but had to call them to
court to perform cross-examinations. 94
This is not to say that defendants were afforded no protections. Though the London
Charter was designed to convict Nazi leaders, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials were not
show trials. The judges took their positions seriously, and never allowed the prosecution
to control the courtroom. Several defendants, notably Goring and Tojo, had little hope of
getting light sentences but understood the nature of the trial and made use of the platform
their testimony provided. Others, such as Albert Speer, Germany's Armaments Minister,
and Mamoru Shigemitsu, who had been a leader of the peace faction in Japan, were able to
gain considerable mitigation.
The precedent-setting charges are the basis of the legal importance of both trials, though
especially Nuremberg. The IMTs would have had little significance in international law
if they had been simply trials under well-established definitions of war crimes, or under
domestic laws-as were held in Germany in the 1950-60s and were planned in occupied
Japan but forbidden by SCAP. 95 Instead, these were the first trials whose defendants were
charged with beginning wars of aggression , as well as with the less controversial charge of
Crimes Against Humanity. The nature of the charges led one participant in the Tokyo trial
to declare its "great consequence to jurists and students of internationallaw." 96

D ifferences
The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials did not take place simultaneously, only generally in
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the same postwar period. Nuremberg was clearly the first; Supreme Court Justice Robert
Jackson's April 1945 appointment as lJS Chief Prosecutor took place before Germany surrendered. While the planning for the Nuremberg IMT was not completed at that time. that
Thuman chose a member of the central judicial institution of the United States- when he
could easily have assigned the task to some lesser civilian authority or the military- was not
taken lightly. Jackson, who devoted his life to a career in a legal system that prided itself
on justice, was a symbol of Anglo-American law, which "could not go along with pretended
trials." 97
In contrast, Thuman waited to appoint Jackson's Far East counterpart until the end of
1\ovember 1945, more than three months after the Pacific War ended. Even then he chose
former Assistant Attorney General Joseph Keenan, who, though an excellent lawyer and
organizer, had many ·shortcomings. Besides his noticeably lower rank, Keenan, who was
a recovering alcoholic, moved in political instead of judicial circles, demonstrated lack of
knowledge of Asian affairs, and had an abrasive personality that made him "often at the
center of a storm." 98 His first week in Tokyo he made a fool of himself by proposing that the
major war criminals be tried under American law for starting wars in China and the Pacific
"since the initial attack was against American territory at Pearl Harbor." 99
More mundane aspects of the justices' courtroom presence gave each courtroom a different feel.

At the first IMT, voting judges and alternates both participated and their

individual opinions and personalities emerged in the record. Due to the bench's larger size
at the IMTFE, the justices decided that only President of the Thibunal William Webb would
normally address the court, so only he had a microphone. 100 The result was that everything
coming from the judges was filtered through Webb's sometimes brusque personality, and
transcripts reveal the Tokyo courtroom's more authoritarian setting.
Broader regional affairs during the period differed completely. In Europe. most of the
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continent was returning to stability and beginning to rebuild. Tensions between the West
and Soviet Union over the shape of postwar central and eastern Europe were t.he biggest
worries. Most of East Asia, on the other hand, went from one war into another. In China,
the civil war between Communists and Nationalists resumed after Japanese troops withdrew,
and local nationalists in what would become Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam fought the
returning imperial powers. The Philippines and India pushed for the independence they
had been promised, and Korea was divided between the United States and USSR, making
occupied Japan virtually the only politically stable area in the whole region.
While the Charters that ruled the IMTs were nearly identical, a different process produced
each. After Jackson's appointment, the four victorious Great Powers- the UK, USA , USSR,
and France-scheduled the International Conference on Military Trials (ICMT) in London
to decide details. Each representative, whose positions held equal or superior status to
Jackson's, had been granted executive authority to sign an agreement on behalf of his country.
The resulting London Charter, a cooperative venture throughout, allowed for each signatory
power to appoint a chief prosecutor for the trial.
The Tokyo Charter reveals itself as an exclusive product of the US occupation simply by
its formal name: SCAP Special Proclamation of 19 January 1946. Though it was a modestly
edited copy of the London Charter, this editing was a unilateral project; SCAP and the International Prosecution Section, which at the time included only Keenan and his appointments,
controlled it completely. Though it allowed for more international representation

nine na-

tions initially, with justices from India and the Philippines included later- the Tokyo Charter allowed for only one Chief Prosecutor appointed by the American commander, General
MacArthur.
The charge of "a common plan or conspiracy" to commit aggressive war exposed this
separate development. The initial reason the charge had been approved was that US leaders
were convinced that a conspiracy, at least within the SS, existed. 101 In other words , it
101
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wa.s ea.sy to imagine Adolf Hitler at the center of a conspiratorial group including Heinrich
Rimmler, Hermann Goring, the Gestapo, and t,he SS. However, conspiracy was a crime
defined only in Anglo-American common law, and wa.s a particularly hard sell for Jackson
at the ICMT in London. To convince French representative Andre Gros of its necessity,
he final1y resorted to naming a specific possible defendant, Hjalmar Schacht, who might be
~onvicted

only on that charge. Differences of opinion surfaced later as well. As the judges

discussed sentencing, French justice Donnedieu de Vabres recommended that the conspiracy
charge be thrown out, and though this wa.s rejected, only eight of the twenty-two defendants
were convicted on the count. 102 After the trial, Henry Stimson stated, "If there is a weakness
in the 'Iribunal's findings, I believe it lies in its very limited construction of t he legal concept
of conspiracy." 103
The situation in Japan wa.s completely different. Japanese militarists had transformed
the Emperor, Japan's only central figure, into a symbol of Japanese nationalism , but he
was a timid private man- hardly a Hitler. There were no nat ional organizations :;imilar t,o
the SS. Japanese leaders had never developed or adapted an ideology comparable to Kazism,
though the native Shinto religion had been misused as a vehicle for nationalistic propaganda.
Inclusion of conspiracy a.s a crime wa.s not a decision made by any international conference-only by Americans who were already familiar with the charge. This "gives a telling
impression of the extent to which America could be driven by a respect for its own law .... The
conspiracy charges worked particularly badly at the Tokyo trials." 104 T he prosecution had to
define the conspiracy widely enough to catch in its net nearly every cabinet member of the
Japanese government plus the highest military officers for the previous fifteen years. Almost
anyone could have participated in such a common plan, and twenty-three of twenty-five
defendants were convicted on that count.
Another possible explanation for the immediate success of Tokyo's conspiracy charge102Taylor, Anatomy, 550.
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and for its later infamy- lies with the judges who passed the verdicts. To spectators, the most
obvious difference between the Nuremberg and Tokyo benches was the number of people:
four versus eleven. At Nuremberg, two came from Anglo-American law practice, and two did
not; at Tokyo, more than half were trained in Anglo-American law- the representatives of
the US, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and India. 105 At the Tokyo
trial, a simple majority determined all judgments; at Nuremberg, with only four voting
judges, a simple majority was also a two-thirds majority. ·w hile familiarity with the concept
of conspiracy certainly does not equate to a vote for conviction , doubtless it neither hurt t he
Anglo-American prosecutors' case nor helped the Japanese defense unfamili ar with it.
There was also a clear conflict of interest, in some of the )i"uremberg participants. At,
the ICMT, Justice Jackson and Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe had personally set t he jurisdiction
of the court before which they were prosecuting. Presiding were fellow designers Robert
Falco, French alternate judge, and General Nikitchenko, the sitting Soviet representative.
Nikitchenko's position is especially troubling, since at the ICMT he expressed t.he opinion
that they were "dealing here with the chief war criminals who have already been convicted
and whose conviction has been already announced by both the Moscow and Crimea declarations." 106
'l\vo representatives on the Tokyo bench had conflicting interests of a different sort. Justice Radhabinod Pal , an Indian nationalist, clearly sympathized with the Japanese posit.ion
and may have decided to acquit the defendants before the trial began. 107 Deflin J aranilla
of the Philippines had fought the Japanese as a volunteer and had been mistreated as a
prisoner of war; his concurring opinion complained of the leniency of the sentencing.
The prevalent imperialist attitudes and outright racism of the time must also be considered in thinking about the Tokyo trial. The amendment of the Tokyo Charter t.o include
representatives from India and the Philippines only partially solved the problem of imperial
105 Brackman,
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powers trying their Japanese competitors. As for racism, even General Douglas MacArthur,
who later showed great respect for the

Japane~e,

was convinced early in the war that Euro-

pean mercenaries were flying enemy aircraft since Japanese racial features prevented them
from being effective pilots. 108

Post-Trial Variances
Since the trials, the Nuremberg record has been more widely available and much more
studied. 109 The complete transcript of the Nuremberg trial, widely available today, was
published immediately after the trial in forty-two volumes including index under the name
Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14
November 1945- 1 October 1946. This availability, combined with its relatively easy use,

.

must be considered as a major reason for the far greater amount of scholarly work on the
Nuremberg trial.
As for Tokyo, "public indifference to the Tokyo Trial has been matched by an apparent lack of interest on the part of the sponsoring governments themselves." 110 No official
collection of the Tokyo transcripts has ever been published. The first publication of even
part of the Tokyo record was Justice Pal's dissenting opinion, which he published privately
in India in 1953. The complete judgment, along with concurring and dissenting opinions,
was edited and published in the 1\etherlands by Justice Roling in 1977. A private company
finally published the complete transcripts in 1981-more than thirty years after the trial
ended. 111 As for scholarship, the major English-language works on the Tokyo trial can be
counted on one hand. Nuremberg has been remembered and praised, Tokyo forgotten.
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Conclusion
As the Allies developed a plan to deal with the leaders of occupied Germany, they did
not have such luxuries as detailed studies of the Nazi regime, helpful summaries of available
information, or even deadlines, since surrender could come at any moment. The Nuremberg
trial's development included haphazard planning, logistical challenges, and fears that a trial
would turn into a Nazi propaganda vehicle. The trial plan became official policy only after
President Truman publicly appointed Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson as "chief of
council" and Hitler's death was confirmed. 112
What made this last-minute trial develop into a landmark of international law? Its
importance stems from decisions made at the International Conference on Military Trials
(IC:MT), which met in London in the summer of 1945. The resultant Charter of the Inter-

.

national Military Tribunal (IMT) first defined as criminal such actions as concpiracy and
aggressive war. The major goal was not simply to punish the guilty-other means cou ld
have quickly and easily done so. Instead, the Allies had a much grander aim: in the words of
Justice Jackson's opening address, "to utilize international law to meet the greatest menace
of our times-aggressive war." 113 While Jackson gave the most idealistic speech, all four
head counsels at Nuremberg highlighted this goal. 114 The aggressive war charge culminated
a decades-long attempt to expand the scope of war crimes beyond violations of the Hague
and Geneva Conventions.
The IMT was not perfect. The conspiracy charge probably should have been dropped
since it "unnecessarily complicated the trial and failed to serve the purpose for which it was
intended." 115 Likewise, the prosecution of organizations in addition to individuals accomplished little since de-Nazification laws met the same goals. Creators of the London Charter
were present both in the prosecution, which abused its privileges, and on the bench, which
112
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disallowed embarrassing comparisons to Allied actions such as the Soviet invasion of Poland.
However, the Allies demonstrated their commitment to predefined law. The prosecution
explicitly opened its case to future criticism as well as defense rebuttal. Unlike the outgoing
Axis regimes, the Allies were willing to admit that they might be wrong, which helps explain
continuing interest in Nuremberg despite its shortcomings and failure as a deterrent. \h/hile
the prosecution dominated the defense, the justices controlled the courtroom and refused
to compromise justice. The unanimous judgment dealt harshly with the guilty-delivering
twelve death sentences and three for life imprisonment-but also acquitted three defendants.
Between the Nuremberg trial's beginning and judgment, a similar effort began for the
wartime leaders of Japan. On paper, the two trials were remarkably similar. Both IMTs took
place in the same postwar era, under basically the same rules and principles, and claimed to
harbinger a new responsibility in international relations. Each trial punished high-ranking
Axis leaders for heinous crimes, though courts-martial might have accomplished this with
less time and effort. Each also successfully revealed a great deal of information, including
otherwise inaccessible witness testimony, about t he character of the regimes that had been
in power in Germany and Japan.
In reality, while the Nuremberg trial was developed cooperatively and took place in a
relatively stable Europe, the International Military Thibunal for the Far East (IMTFE) was
dominated by the United States, received little attention from governments or the press,
and took place while much of East Asia was in revolution or civil war. At the same time as
the Western powers tried Japanese leaders for attempting to conquer East Asia, they were
forcibly reimposing their will in places like the Dutch East Indies and French Indochina.
While the Tokyo trial had greater international representation, the United States wielded
far greater control than any nation had done at Nuremberg. This was a product of the Pacific
\Var, in which United States troops had done most of the fighting, and the occupation of
Japan, which was not divided up like Germany.
At the IMTFE, seventeen of the twenty-six defendants were high-ranking military officers,
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reflecting military control of the Japanese government. MacArthur, with t he prosecution 's
cooperation, protected the Emperor from prosecution, though his Lord Keeper of the Privy
Seal, Marquis Koichi Kido, was tried as a proxy of sorts. The prosecution used Kido's
extensive diary as a guide to investigation, which raises questions about the validity of using
one defendant's opinions against others. The Tokyo proceedings revealed more intrigue
and divergent goals among the accused than those at Nuremberg. The military defendants
argued that Japan was fighting a war of economic self-defense. These arguments, the same
that Japan had used before and during the war, were unlikely to convince Allied judges of
their innocence.
The lack of screening for the Tokyo 'Iribunal's judges has been its most criticized aspect. 116 Several justices had prominent shortcomings or conflicts of interest . .\1ore than half
had a background in ·Anglo-American law, which was not practiced in Japan and therefore
was unfamiliar to the defendants. The Tokyo Judgment , supplemented by three full and two
partial dissents , delivered seven death sentences, ten life imprisonments, and no acquittals.
The most surprising sentence was hanging for former Prime Minister Hirota , who had no
direct connection to atrocities. Though all the justices except Pal signed a secrecy agreement,
from the information in dissenting opinions and his own recollection Justice ROling later
concluded that Hirota had been sentenced to death on a 6-5 vote.U 7 The bench also fo und
all but two defendants guilty of a conspiracy to commit aggressive war; at 1'\uremberg,
only eight of twenty-two were convicted on that charge. The IMTFE's decisions were not
unanimous; in t heir later published opinions, Justice Pal and President Webb objected to
the conspiracy charge, Webb calling it "nothing less than judiciallegislation." 118
Vlhy is the International Military 'fribunal today considered a landmark of international
law in contrast to its counterpart in the Far East? The Nuremberg trial's positive legacy is
easier to explain than t he Tokyo trial's negat.ive one. Despite its shortcomings, the Nurem116See, for example, Minear, Victor's Justice, 75-92.
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berg trial had truly impressive results. For the first time, victorious powers were willing to
let international law- albeit a form dictated by the winners-decide the fate of their foes.
At Tokyo, however, discrepancies between the European and Pacific situations became
apparent. The Pacific War had been no just war, as was clear to both the Japanese defendants
and their judges. While Japanese troops committed worse crimes, the Allies were imperialist
powers guilty of many of the same crimes- mistreatment of enemy soldiers and civilians,
abusing native peoples, and attacking other countries aggressively-as the Japanese. The
Nuremberg trial had emphasized that the Allies were different; the Tokyo highlighted the
Allies' shortcomings.
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